This bioethics article deals with the conflict and difficulty in quality of life judgements.
INtrODUCtION
There are many triumphs and heart-aches that occur in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) in the Singapore General Hospital. Here, teams of professionals labour to provide the best possible care for sick infants.
This article, however, provides an in-depth insider perspective of one of the most difficult medical decision making processes and their considerations when dealing with infants with poor prognoses. There are categories of critically ill new-borns which present with especially difficult treatment decisions, mainly infants at the threshold of viability (infants born between 22-25 gestational weeks) 1 or those born with severe/ multiple congenital abnormalities and infants who are severely impaired by perinatal and early neonatal complications.
This emotive topic explores the vital interplay between the patient, parents, and medical staff, especially in the presence of conflicting opinions.
With the infant's best interest foremost, the spectrum of care ranges from active management to decisions to withdraw and finally to palliative care.
tHE trEAtMENt DILEMMAs
A decision on the optimal care for certain critically ill newborn represents neither a new problem nor a previously ignored problem. As medical technology advances, outcomes for high-risk newborn infants have greatly improved. Growing numbers of healthy children bear witness to success in not only preserving the life of such infants but also in preventing disability from many brain-damaging conditions.
If intensive treatment uniformly resulted in saving infants at risk, it would be the obvious choice for all severely ill infants. This outcome, of course, does not always occur. Intensive care has also been successful in rescuing infants with conditions where it can be predicted, with reasonable degree of certainty, that permanent and crippling disability will result.
A dilemma therefore exists: intensive care of all severely ill infants sometimes results in amongst other things, occasional iatrogenic illness and/or prolongation of partial or lack of specific treatment results in increased mortality and unnecessary morbidity. There is a role in avoiding extraordinary treatments and indiscriminate use of technology in certain infants.
The High-risk Infants
Three groups of high-risk infants always present with difficult treatment decisions for their parents and paediatricians: a. infants born between 22-25 gestational weeks, considered at the threshold of viability;
b. infants born with major and/or multiple congenital abnormalities; c. infants severely damaged by complications of pregnancy, delivery, or the early neonatal period.
"BEst INtErEsts" OF tHE INFANt
There is often conflict and difficulty in judgement involving quality of life issues. This is especially so when many parents and health professionals have differing opinions regarding a pure "sanctity of life" philosophy. Such a dictum considers taking human life as being categorically wrong since all humans are of equal intrinsic value and should be treated with equal respect.
Assessing "quality of life" does not imply making judgements about an infant's "social worth" to the community, nor should the financial costs of long-term care to the family, hospital, or state be a prevailing concern. To the neonatologist, it means being compassionately concerned about the infant's capacity for future health, development and well-being and about the crushing human costs to the child and family that will accrue with survival.
In caring for the vulnerable infants who lack autonomy in decision-making and who have no competence, the ethical principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence 2 should prevail to ensure justice in the care they deserve. There is a moral obligation to take positive steps to act for the benefits of these infants and contribute to their welfare, promoting their well-being and not merely refraining from causing harm 3 .
The principle of "best interests" is central to medical practice. Therefore, medical care decisions should reflect the best interests of the infant. Because critically ill infants are unable to articulate or advocate for their own interests, it is important that there be societal safeguards to assure that they are protected.
"Best interests" requires that surrogates employ this principle to maximise benefits and minimise harms to newborn infants by weighing the benefits and burdens of treatment options (including non-treatment) as objectively as possible. The anticipated benefits of the proposed course should outweigh the anticipated harms, with a more favourable benefit/harm ratio than other possible courses of action. This brings some degree of objectivity to the process of determining the 'best interest' of a perceived subjective area of bioethics since parents, doctors, and others involved in the decision making process may have different ideas about what is in the best interests of the baby. The Nuffield Council of Bioethics 4 gave guidance on clarifying how best interests are judged, such as determining the degree of pain, suffering, and mental distress any treatment will inflict on the child, what benefits the future child will get from treatment, for example, will the child be able to survive independently off life support, be capable of establishing relationships with other people, and be able to experience pleasure of any kind? The availability of support to provide the optimum care for the child is also an important consideration.
Who decides what constitutes a benefit and what constitutes harm? This procedural question is of pivotal importance because benefits and harms often lie in the eyes of the beholder (be they parents or health professionals), whose perceptions are influenced by personal values and experiences. Even if we can articulate the principle of "best interests" and explain the obligation that physicians and parents have when making choices for infants, what the right choices and right processes are, can be hard to define in individual cases 5 .
For both legal and moral reasons, parents are given a wide latitude to decide what enhances their child's well-being in areas ranging from housing, clothing, nutrition, and religion, to health care decisions. This is based on that belief that virtually all parents love their children and wish them to be healthy and happy members of society. As such, parents can identify the interests of their child and they can and do assess what they believe to be in the best interest of their child. This authority, however, is not absolute, and their assessment can be challenged. In more complex cases where there is conflict about what the right choice for a critically ill infant is, parents may quickly realise that the best interest of their child is often unclear and uncertain.
When parents and health professionals disagree, it is most often because there is no single objective criterion to guide their judgement. Health professionals play an important role in assessing what is in the interest of their patients. When patients cannot make informed choices, physicians have a greater obligation to assess what is in the interest of the patient and to advocate for these interests when critical choices must be made. These obligations require judgements, independent of family wishes, concerning what the appropriate choice is for the infant. Physicians stand as societal representatives to assure that choices parents make are within a range of acceptable and reasonable options based on reasonable assessment of the interests of the child. However, the physicians cannot assert authoritatively that their values are better than those of the parents. They may understand the medical facts better and may have more expertise and experience in dealing with sick newborns. However, such medical expertise does not necessarily confer moral expertise. Some health professionals also face difficulty making objective assessments about the interest of their infant-patients. They may bring personal values and experiences to their decisions. They respond to their responsibility in varying ways. Some wish to maintain control of the decisionmaking, some are worried that they will be criticised for their decision while others are concerned that the death of a patient is a failure. Yet, others are burdened by a desire not to inflict undue pain and suffering on their patients. It is therefore important for health professionals to explore their own feelings and attitude toward chronic diseases and disabilities and always have the child's interests in mind.
Ultimately, the most appropriate decisions should be made through a process of communication and value exploration between the parents and well-intentioned physicians by encouraging open communication among the participants in the decision, and by the acceptance of all parties of the inherent value conflicts that are at the basis of any disagreement. Just as physicians ought not to view their duty as blind advocacy for any chance of the continued life for their patients, parents ought to be given wide latitude in their choices, particularly when the likelihood of benefits is marginal or uncertain. The basic goal is collaborative decisionmaking by placing the child, as much as possible, in the centre of the analysis in an attempt to ascertain his or her interests. The goal should not be about making identical decisions in all medically similar cases. Rather, acceptance of differing family values will result in different decisions in medically similar cases, out of respect for parental views, beliefs and wishes. One must also consider the interests of all potentially affected persons, such as other family members, old or young, who will live with the child or are dependent upon the immediate family in other ways 6 , 7 . Such an approach is therefore consistent with our respect for personal values and family autonomy, while still protecting the rights and interests of the child.
INItIAtION OF trEAtMENt: rEsUsCItAtION At BIrtH
The perinatal management of a vulnerable foetus and critically ill newborn is multidisciplinary, requiring close collaboration between obstetricians, paediatricians, nursing staff, and other supporting professionals 8,9 . Forward planning and consensus between members of the perinatal team are essential. Failure of communication can lead to slip-ups such as having inexperienced or unavailable neonatal staff when the obstetricians have just carried out caesarean-section for foetal indications, or the delivery of a sick, immature foetus. It is therefore most critical that there is leadership or guidelines for junior staff when emergencies require decisions to be made in morally uncertain situations 10 .
When it is clear that a critically ill newborn will result, it is important to use the time before Review Proceedings of Singapore Healthcare  Volume 22  Number 3  2013 delivery for consultation with the family. Physicians should avoid characterising managements of uncertain benefit as "doing everything possible". Most parents are unfamiliar with the complexities of care required for the infant, both in the intensive care unit and after discharge from the hospital. Therefore, it is often necessary to provide the information in small segments at frequent intervals to allow the parents to comprehend the messages.
The family should be given clear explanation of the various supportive procedures that will likely be necessary after birth. Family members should also be provided with an overview of the potential complications of prolonged intensive care. They should also be informed of the range of survival rates and of the rates of long-term disabilities that can be expected. In compiling such information, data reported in the current literature as well as outcomes based on local and specific institutional experience are relevant. It should be emphasised that the available data pertain to groups but that decisions must be made for individuals. Discussions should include the possibility that the risks and outlook may change after birth and decisions about neonatal management made prior to delivery may have to be modified subsequently by the infant's condition and response to treatments.
Even then, parents may be totally unprepared for the situation and decisions often have to be made at very short notice. They need to be guided by the advice of their physicians who have to take a stance and allow parents to assent to or disagree with the plan, rather than throwing the entire weight of decision in their laps. If there is a departmental or institutional policy on resuscitation of the critically ill newborn, it should be quoted and explained. Ideally, the obstetric and neonatal staff should confer before counselling the parents. Each member of the healthcare team should make every effort to maintain a consistent theme in their discussions with family members regarding the assessment, prognosis, and recommendations for care.
If there is good reason to treat an infant and resuscitation becomes necessary, it should be started immediately to maximum efficiency and capacity. Half-hearted, poorly conducted resuscitation may only prolong dying or may lead to the infant's eventual survival with even more grievous handicap. It also increases distress for everyone.
It may not be possible to give an accurate prognosis at the time of birth. All currently-available techniques for estimating foetal weight have a significant degree of inaccuracy, even under ideal circumstances 11 . An infant estimated to weigh 600 grams(g) may have an actual birth weight of less than 500 g or more than 700 g. Even relatively small discrepancies of one or two weeks in gestational age or 100 to 200 g in birth weight may have major implications for survival and long-term morbidity. This underscores the importance of counselling about the range of possible outcomes.
Therefore, the approach to this should always be to initiate maximum treatment, including endotracheal intubation and assisted ventilation if necessary, thereby improving survival chances, until a more considered judgement can be made, usually by a senior doctor, on the advisability of continuing life support. If further developments or later assessments indicate that there is a high likelihood of extensive brain damage, or a "do-notresuscitate" order has previously been decided upon (e.g. in the presence of major congenital abnormalities), treatment may be stopped.
One likely emergency in the delivery room is a severely asphyxiated infant. Rapid clinical assessment at birth, including the Apgar scores, may not always give an accurate picture of the infant's condition or future prospects. The subsequent pattern of recovery and the presence or absence of complications, especially signs of neurological dysfunction, will provide a more accurate estimation of severity and prognosis.
Most of the extremely premature infants are potentially normal at birth, especially when the perinatal management has been optimal. They rely on prompt and adequate treatment to protect them from death or permanent damage in the first few weeks after birth. It has been documented that for those with a potential for survival, their mortality and disability rates are significantly increased by suboptimal and half-hearted resuscitative efforts and delay in initiating appropriate care in the first vital minutes and hours after birth. The decision not to resuscitate is essentially an irreversible step: a change of heart and belated rescue of a cold, acidotic premature infant may result in intracranial haemorrhage and further disability 12 There must be a place for parents giving advance authorisation for non-resuscitation and nonprovision of intensive care for their infants during counselling. It is important to note that when a physician agrees to a surrogate's request for a donot-resuscitate order, the physician would have assessed the patient's medical condition and concurs that non-resuscitation is a reasonable choice. However, due to the uncertainty of the circumstances of each individual delivery, and the need to assess the patient before making the decision as to whether or not to resuscitate, a do-not-resuscitate order prior to delivery is inappropriate [13] [14] [15] . The initiation of resuscitation and subsequent treatments in the neonatal intensive care unit do not preclude discontinuation of therapy if a major complication is detected in the hours or days following birth.
CONtINUAtION OF trEAtMENt
After initiating treatment at delivery and subsequent stabilisation in the neonatal intensive care unit, treatment of a curative nature should always be continued where there is a medical consensus that it would provide a net benefit to the infant. The infant's medical condition should be the sole focus of any decision-making process. If it is unclear whether curative treatment would be beneficial; the bias should always be to err in favour of continuing treatment 16 .
If a baby is intubated and on a ventilator, he/she should also receive thermoregulation, nutritional and metabolic support, protective isolation, and antibiotics where appropriate. There is no place for half-hearted care. Intensive care is only justified if the intent is to save the infant's life and to avoid any subsequent brain damage. Factors such as anticipated likelihood of the infant falling short of expected physical or intellectual norms, or suboptimal family or community resources must not be sole determinants for decision to discontinue curative efforts.
Appropriateness of Treatment
In debating the justification of omitting or continuing certain treatments, terms such as "ordinary" and "extraordinary" are often used. The argument is that one has an obligation to provide ordinary care, whereas the provision of extraordinary care is morally optional. However, such distinctions flounder in practice because of the difficulty that arises when trying to define the word "extraordinary" in a consistent or practical way 17 .
A treatment considered extraordinary a decade ago may be very ordinary today, and what is extraordinary in some circumstances may be very ordinary in others. While mechanical ventilation would be considered extraordinary in prolonging the life of an anencephalic infant, it would be considered very ordinary care for a postoperative patient. Therefore, there is nothing intrinsic to the technology that makes a ventilator extraordinary.
The important consideration is whether or not it is appropriate for life to be prolonged. Does prolonging this life offer a reasonable hope of benefit to the individual concerned? If so, then "ordinary" and "extraordinary" treatments may be appropriate. If not, then both of them may be inappropriate with the exception of those treatments that are necessary to relieve distress.
"Treat until Certainty"
When dealing with prognostic uncertainty, a "treat until certainty" approach has been adopted in the past and it still dominates the practice in many neonatal intensive care units 18 . This approach favours fully aggressive support in almost every infant who is believed to have any chance of survival until death or severe, adverse medical findings become unequivocally evident.
Its most significant drawback is the creation of a momentum in favour of treatment that may be difficult to stop. It tends to relegate parents to the role of bystanders, and may result in denial of the ethical complexity of situations by failing to address moral as well as medical uncertainty. Even with the passage of time, uncertainty may still remain. The enthusiastic use of expensive technology which may prove useless or harmful, may not always serve an individual infant's best interests.
WItHHOLDING VErsUs WItHDrAWING trEAtMENt
It is widely accepted that there is no moral distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment. Historically and psychologically, physicians are more reluctant to discontinue a treatment once it has begun.
Withdrawal of treatment may be felt to be more justified by some, for two reasons. Firstly, the withdrawal of treatment has the benefit of coming after having tried treatment. It will be easier to initiate treatment and begin intensive care when this care can be withdrawn should it become evident that it is ineffective and has not achieved its beneficial intent. Secondly, it gives some patients a chance to receive treatment because without this option of withdrawal, some physicians would rather withhold care.
Withdrawing of Life-sustaining Treatment
When the burden of curative efforts lacks compensating benefit or such treatment is futile, there is no need to continue or pursue it. Therapies lack compensating benefit when they merely prolong the dying process, when the infant suffers from severe pain which cannot be alleviated by medical treatment, or when the infant will be unable to participate even minimally in human experience.
The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (United Kingdom) have identified five situations where the withholding or withdrawing of lifesustaining treatment might reasonably be considered in the newborn period: 9 1. the brain-dead child;
2. the permanent vegetative state;
3. the no chance situation, where life-sustaining treatment is simply delaying death without significant alleviation of suffering; 4. the no purpose situation, where the infant's potential of having an extremely significant degree of impairment is inevitable, and it would not be reasonable to expect him or her to bear it. This might apply to a severely asphyxiated infant where microcephaly, profound developmental delay, blindness, and quadriplegia are believed to be inevitable. This could also reflect conditions where brain damage is not necessarily the worrying outcome, e.g. the ventilator-dependent infant with bronchopulmonary dysplasia suffering cor pulmonale, and the hyperalimentationdependent infant with short bowel syndrome from necrotising enterocolitis; 5. the unbearable situation, where a family may feel that further treatment is more than can be borne. They wish to have treatment withdrawn or wish to refuse further treatment irrespective of medical opinion. Parents may be able to recognise that it is reasonable to put up with short-term suffering for a good later outcome. There is a limit, however, to this tolerance. Parents may then feel that withholding or withdrawing treatment is the most appropriate option. An example might be the newborn infant with hypoplastic left heart syndrome, where successful survival may be possible with multiple and complex procedures.
These situations illustrate the relationship between beneficence and non-maleficence -benefits must always outweigh the harm. When decisions are made to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, the term "futility" of continued medical treatment has been used extensively. What constitutes "futile" treatment has always been controversial. In brief, a life-sustaining treatment is considered futile if it cannot benefit a patient in the narrow, strictly physiological sense, such as mechanical ventilation being physiologically futile when it will not maintain adequate ventilation or oxygenation. In practice, however, few interventions are physiologically futile, rather, there are common interventions of which the probable effectiveness is low and the anticipated quality of life for the patient is unacceptable, from the observers' perspectives 19 .
Palliative Treatment
When a decision is made to withhold or discontinue resuscitation, or to forego life-sustaining treatments, the family should be treated with dignity and compassion. Humane and compassionate care must be provided to the nonviable or dying infant, and to the family. This includes careful handling, maintaining warmth, avoidance of unnecessary invasive and painful procedures, and unobtrusive monitoring -sometimes called "comfort care".
When medical support is discontinued or death is inevitable, time and opportunity should be provided for the parents and other family members to hold, touch, and interact with the infant before and after the infant dies. Simple personalising acts, such as naming the infant; obtaining a photograph, cot card, name band, footprint, or even a lock of hair; recording birth weight and other measurements; and baptism when appropriate, may be important to the parents and should be provided. The presence and support of the medical team are also part of the vital aspects of care that cushion the Proceedings of Singapore Healthcare  Volume 22  Number 3  2013 impact of an unavoidable death.
Since every infant is unique, the specifics of palliative treatment must be individualised. If a decision has been made that continued survival is not in the infant's interest, it may seem irrelevant whether he or she died by active or passive means. However, there are big differences between active measures to terminate life (active euthanasia) and allowing a patient to die owing to some intrinsic disease or as a progression of the illness. The latter is considered withholding treatment, an acceptable act of omission.
The objections to active euthanasia are based, in part, on how life is sacred. It undermines the duty of doctors to save lives. The swiftness and irreversibility of such action, precluding the possibility of changing course if it is discovered that the decision was wrong, is another concern. An even greater concern, however, has been the "slippery slope" effects: that lowering the barrier against killing will make it easier for physicians to kill others, that boundaries will become less distinct, and a danger that infants who may have a chance of survival may not be given this chance 20 .
Fortunately, active euthanasia and its advocates and proponents, (an example being the group that described the Groningen protocol) 21 have met with unease and a lack of enthusiasm 22 . Much criticism was levelled at using spina bifida as a surrogate of poor quality of life when many such patients exist well in society. Others criticise it for allowing parents an excuse for infanticide to excuse the burden of care, and also letting doctors determine what is quality of life. There is also abhorrence to utilitarian thinkers such as Peter Singer, who held that exterminating disabled children would allow resources to be used for "normal" children. Also, Singer's idea of "disabled" as opposed to normal children is eugenistic in nature. It is also worrying that Singer left his definitions of 'disabled' deliberately vague 23 .
In general, when a decision has been made, it is not unethical to remove all means of life-prolonging medical treatment. Although there are consensus in withdrawing medical treatments such as antibiotics and artificially supported respiration, many doctors still feel uneasy about the use of drugs to relieve pain and discomfort which may hasten death, and the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition.
There are difficulties in determining whether infants perceive pain at the time of impending death. However, the use of analgesics may be considered part of the provision of comfort care, despite the potential respiratory depression of opiates 24 . On the other hand, withdrawal of hydration or nutrition is extremely emotive and requires support of the family and members of the health care team 25 . It may create great stress for caregivers and the family, even though it is understood that nutrition and hydration, like medication, may be withdrawn where appropriate. The practice may be easier when an infant with a hopeless prognosis cannot be fed orally, and requires feeding via other onerous routes.
DECIsION MAKING IN tHE INtENsIVE CArE UNIt: PHYsICIAN's rOLE
The decisions involved in shifting the emphasis from curative to palliative treatments are difficult and come about gradually as the infant's physical condition deteriorates. Fundamentally, these medical decisions require sufficient observation and expert assessment of the prognosis and likely effectiveness and risks of therapy. Sometimes, a waiting period is required until the worsening condition becomes more evident, before discontinuation of curative efforts can be enacted.
The range of complexity in clinical situations make it impossible to define criteria for discontinuing curative efforts. The relevant factors are at times imprecise and include value considerations. Strictly objective criteria, checklists or cumulative scoring systems are unlikely to improve the quality of decision-making.
One acceptable approach is a family-centred "individualised prognostic strategy". In this strategy, care is provided for the individual infant at the appropriate level based on the expected outcome at the time care is initiated. The infant is constantly re-evaluated, and the prognosis is reassessed based on the best available information in conjunction with the physician's best medical judgement.
Unless there are obvious congenital malformations, the foresight of statistical outcomes allow infants with a reasonable chance to survive to be aggressively supported in the delivery room, after which the individual infant's response to initial aggressive intensive care is assessed. With this information, the primary physicians and other healthcare team members meet with the family to discuss treatment options. The critical part of this strategy is the multiple options available. It recognises and openly accepts the uncertainty of prognosis, and that there is more than one possible outcome, the plurality of societal views in that there is more than one possible choice, and the appropriateness of the surrogate decision maker (usually the parent), to choose among medically, ethically, and legally sound treatment options, when the benefit/burden ratio is uncertain 26 .
This approach places significant responsibility on the physician and healthcare team to evaluate the infant accurately and continuously. The importance of having a primary physician taking charge of the decision-making process and counselling the parents cannot be over-emphasised.
The role of the primary physician is to be the advocate for the infant towards whom he has moral and legal obligations. He or she should be a senior and experienced member of the team who will unite the team to an effective common cause, with a clear understanding of the differences in responsibility between conveying day-to-day information versus information about severe diagnoses and prognostic significance of specific findings. This person will consult with colleagues and other appropriate subspecialists and employ all appropriate technologies to thoroughly assess and confirm the diagnosis and prognosis of the infant. Good ethical decisions require accurate medical facts, and even sound ethical reasoning will not rescue a decision based on erroneous assumptions.
Together, the team attempts to define the issues, outline options and decide on the nature of treatment. The primary physician should then be able to integrate all the important information and maintain a consistent pattern of communication with the parents. As the individual with an overall perspective of the medical realities of the case and who has close contact with the family, the primary physician is in the best position to make a sound recommendation of the preferred treatment option to the parents. The decisions should be made openly and documented so that doctors are seen to be accountable for their actions. By following this course, the risk of placing undue reliance on a single person's judgement is avoided.
PArENtAL PArtICIPAtION IN DECIsION MAKING
The effectiveness of the medical team depends on the extent to which their relationship with the parents is based on frank and open discussion and mutual trust, from the outset. Physicians will provide parents with accurate, timely information on the infant, and with as much medical certainty as possible. The parents bear the principal moral responsibility for the well-being of their infant and should therefore be the surrogates for their infants.
Effective communication entails more than mere disclosure of information. Parents should be actively involved in major decisions that ultimately could alter the infant's outcome. It should encourage the parents' active participation in discussion and assure them that their views are fundamental to the decision-making process.
During conversation with the physician, parents will identify and re-examine their values and treatment preferences, which on reflection they may either affirm or alter. In this way, the parents would have been in close communication and by the time a medical consensus is reached for discontinuation of curative efforts, they would appreciate that all reasonable hope has been exhausted.
The pre-eminence of the parents' decision does not preclude the primary physician's responsibility to make a definite recommendation on the preferred treatment option. It is incorrect to provide a mass of medical facts and leave the parents adrift without specific guidance. The basic prerequisites are that the decision is made voluntarily and without coercion and that the parents have full understanding of the options and implications. The primary physician may have to guide parents towards what is acceptable not only medically but also legally, sometimes even sharing about former patients in similar situations. He must also be sensitive to the parents' concerns and desires, which are often based on a complex combination of values and influences derived from their cultural, religious, educational, and ethnic backgrounds.
Belief in spiritualism and forces greater than science and medicine may be values held by some families. The medical team must maintain respect for their views and values, even when they do not agree Proceedings of Singapore Healthcare  Volume 22  Number 3  2013 and cannot concur. Respect of an opinion does not imply capitulation. The doctor counselling the parents should be careful not to impose his own cultural and religious convictions on those whose beliefs may be different.
Studies have shown that parental participation in decision making in the intensive care unit did not interfere with mourning nor burden them with guilt. It may even ameliorate their subsequent grieving process. The more open, informed, and collaborative the process, the better the quality of decisions and comfort with which they are made 27 .
rEsOLVING DIFFErENCEs: rOLE OF tHE BIOEtHICs COMMIttEE
The rights and decision of the parents must always be respected. However, physicians should not be forced to undertreat or overtreat an infant if, in their best medical judgement, the treatment is not in compliance with the standard of care for that infant. Although in most instances, a morally sound decision regarding the best course of action in a particular situation can be agreed upon, such attempts at consensual decision-making may sometimes be unsuccessful.
It may be unrealistic to expect an agreement from the parents the first time a difficult option is offered, and time should be allowed for further clinical observation and deliberation. It is important to ensure full parental comprehension of the medical information and continue to discuss and explore the underlying reasons for any differences in choice. Sometimes, an interdisciplinary case conference, with or without the presence of parents, may help to discuss differing viewpoints and work towards consensus 28 .
One option is for the physician and family to seek another physician willing to provide care for the infant in the manner desired by the family. Quite rarely, it may be necessary to invoke established child protective mechanisms if parents wish to forgo life-sustaining treatment which physicians disagree with, and the parties cannot resolve their differences. This disagreement between the physicians and the family may result in the involvement of the court. During this time, the physician should continue to serve as advocate for the infant.
When there is a serious and intractable conflict or disagreement between the recommendations of the physician and the desires of the parents, one option is to consult with the hospital's bioethics committee.
In an attempt to ensure that morally acceptable and legally appropriate decisions are being made, there is increasing support for a procedural approach based on Roderick Firth's "Ideal Observer Theory" 29 . An ideal ethical observer has five characteristics: (1) omniscience, the decision has included all the readily and relevant facts; (2) omnipercipience, the decision has empathetically taken into account the feelings of those involved; (3) disinterest, the decision is not based on vested interests; (4) dispassion, the decision is not made under conditions in which strong emotions obscure critical thinking and (5) consistency, that similar cases are decided similarly.
Because no person can attain this ideal, a collaborative process is used to approximate these characteristics. Fost and Cranford 30 proposed in 1985 that hospitals should set up bioethics committees to advice on controversial management issues such as decisions on the care of high-risk newborns. Whether they will lead to "better" decisions for infants remains to be seen. Their establishment is voluntary but their role and objective should be well-defined.
There are certain apprehensions towards bioethics committees. The decision-making process between the doctors and parents is an intensely private affair and interference by outsiders like the bioethics committees may cause confusion and complication. Members of the bioethics committees, no matter how able or sincerely motivated, may not understand all the complexities and implications of the situations that affect individual families. The more remote the decision-makers, the more remote the decision will be from infant and family realities. These committee members may disagree among themselves, and some members may dominate others. They may also be more concerned with the institutional impact of a decision rather than with the specifics of the case. Moreover, bioethics committees are effective in an advisory capacity only. However, they provide a good mechanism to review decisions for critically ill newborn infants to ensure the best and appropriate care for them and to assure the public that ethically sound decisions are being made within the NICU. By increasing discussion and deliberation of the complex issues,
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A further role of the bioethics committee will be to provide "ethical comfort" and give some legal protection for staff and family alike in carrying out these difficult decisions. It should rarely be called upon to play the main consultative role in assisting in resolving difference in opinions. Instead, the bioethics committee should help strengthen communication and understanding between health professionals and parents. It is recommended that rapid access to a clinical ethics committee is available 4 .
sUPPOrt AND AFtErCArE
The medical team should continue to provide support to the family after the death of the infant. Use of support groups, intermittent contact by phone, and a later conference with the family to review the medical events surrounding the infant's death and to evaluate the grieving response of the parents may be considered. Parents will require further counselling on the outlook for future pregnancies.
It is imperative that centres that provide neonatal intensive care must also provide a mechanism to ensure continuing care and evaluation of their high-risk survivors. The surviving high-risk infants may suffer from problems and disabilities requiring management from a variety of medical disciplines over a long period. A full summary of perinatal and postnatal events should be prepared and made available to all the healthcare teams that may be involved in the follow-up care. There may be problems encountered in providing follow-up services often constrained by limited resources. Therefore, individual follow-up programmes must clearly define their own goals and objectives and then organise their roles and activities accordingly. Other objectives of follow-up programmes include quality control and perinatal audit. Data on both short-and long-term outcomes are important for counselling and decision-making.
tHE rOLE OF LEGIsLAtION
Legislation can never be drafted or devised adequately to deal with the complicated medical issues involved when deciding on appropriate treatment for the severely damaged or malformed infants. Legislation is needed, though, to uphold the primary prejudice in favour of life and doctors should not be allowed to practise outside the law.
Doctors who bring about the death of their patients through negligence are at risk of prosecution. However, one who competently and reasonably comes to a consensus with the healthcare team and parents that continuation of curative efforts is either futile or will only impose a burden which is disproportionate to its possible benefits, ought not to fear legal consequences. However, there have been no legal precedents locally, and predicted outcome of a legal challenge will be speculative, at best.
When responsible doctors and parents act upon a carefully made decision, there should be no conflict with the law and the law must accord them protection.
rEsOUrCE ALLOCAtION
No nation, no matter how affluent, can hope to provide unlimited resources for healthcare or keep pace with costly advances of high-technology medicine. Resource allocation questions are important, particularly in this era of healthcare reform and cost-consciousness.
At the level of macro allocation 31 (decision about which services to provide to which groups), society must decide on the status of the highrisk infants as a group, the resources that can or cannot be devoted to their immediate care, the extent to which support can be offered for the longer term aftercare, and the degree of latitude that parents and their physicians can exercise in making decisions.
Limited resources will require equitable limits on medical treatment. Such restrictions require careful consideration of their social, cultural, political, and economical consequences and should be made at a public policy level. These decisions though, are not clinical decisions, and physicians should avoid such "bedside rationing".
Neonatal intensive care is subjected to rigorous cost-benefit audit and analysis. Though economic costs are only a part of the equation, there is a constant dilemma of limited resources that may affect treatment decisions. Although it is certainly appropriate for physicians and others who are making choices concerning technological Proceedings of Singapore Healthcare  Volume 22  Number 3  2013 interventions for infants to be aware of the amounts of money such treatments cost, it is inappropriate for them to discontinue treatment using "squandering" of societal resources as the rationale. It is also naïve to believe that money saved by not treating a critically ill newborn in a NICU will go directly to preventive services or the purchase of a needed piece of equipment for that unit.
Such decisions about rationing care will become necessary on purely economic grounds if we shrink from formalising criteria based on what is best for the infants and families. To provide intensive care for all infants regardless of their weight, gestational age, or condition, apart from the potential for harm to them and their families, may seriously affect the ability of an overloaded and understaffed unit to provide adequate care for other infants. This may have serious consequences for some who might otherwise have had every expectation of survival and a healthy future. The subsequent medium-and long-term costs of care may be less easy to quantify. The staff of intensive care units must document their performance and results in ways that can be compared and analysed.
Guidelines for neonatal intensive care will continue to change. Such changes must be based on accurate information. Increasingly difficult choices may be necessary. This will require strong medical leadership and careful consideration of all relevant moral, ethical, social, and legal issues that are inseparable from providing intensive care at any age. The perinatal high-risk team should be more than a group of healthcare professionals working in an isolated area of the hospital, trying to master new technology and break new ground. It should be an open, analytic, self-critical, and responsible group providing care of the highest medical and also ethical standards to pregnant women, newborn infants, and their families.
CONCLUsION
In confronting the dilemmas in making medical decisions, doctors have traditionally been guided by the principles enshrined in the Hippocratic oath which have attempted to keep pace, but not always successfully, with changes in medicine and society.
New knowledge, modern technology, and some aspects of contemporary society have exposed the limitations of codes in helping doctors grapple realistically with these modern dilemmas. It must be emphasised that no matter how many oaths, codes, or guidelines are promulgated, they cannot be viewed simply as books of rules to cover all possible moral situations. Some may even conflict with individual moral beliefs.
Each doctor within himself or herself must decide if by acting in the best interests of the patients, are his actions morally "correct" or "incorrect" and if they conform to current standards of ethical behaviour as determined by colleagues and society. There must, however, be considerations of what patients' parents expect and accept.
Moreover, doctors must also consider if their actions are legal or illegal within the legal framework. What doctors and parents need are not more laws or legal prescriptions and proscriptions, but more understanding of what brain damage and congenital abnormality mean, more compassion for the afflicted infants, more appreciation of family realities in individual circumstances, and considerable latitude to work out the dilemmas in the best interests of the infant and the family.
The wider society's perception is also unavoidable. A doctor's own conscience, integrity, and humanity will be the final arbiters of his decisions. Ultimately, the most appropriate decisions should be made through a process of communication and value exploration between the well-meaning parents and well-intentioned physicians.
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